Monitoring technology and firm boundaries: Physician-hospital integration and technology utilization![]() Jeffrey S. McCullough Eli M. Snir Recent years have witnessed fundamental changes to medical care management in efforts to contain cost. We study two noteworthy trends. First, physicians and hospitals have increasingly engaged in exclusive long-term contracts, a practice also known as "vertical integration." In theory, vertical integration may improve coordination between hospitals and physicians thus reducing inefficiency. Second, hospitals have invested in information technology (IT) specifically designed to monitor physicians' hospital-based activities. Potentially, hospital administrators could use these technologies to coordinate and influence the behavior of either integrated or non-integrated physicians. In particular, we study whether vertical integration and physician monitoring technologies are complementary practices in U.S. hospitals. Background
The interaction between IT and organizational structure is at the heart of IT adoption and may be responsible for much the recent IT-driven productivity gains. Consequently, there is a growing literature describing IT and firm transformation. This literature seeks to explain how IT is transforming society, whether IT leads to large integrated organizations by reducing the cost of coordinating resources or whether IT leads to smaller and leaner organizations that use IT for outsourcing and contracts. Overall, researchers have found that aggregate IT investment is associated with smaller firms and less vertical integration. We build upon the literature in three ways. First, we develop a theoretical model that relates the potential value of monitoring technology to the vertical relationship between physicians and hospitals. Second, we utilize data that describe more than 1,200 hospitals' specific IT applications as well as their contractual relationships with physicians. The use of IT application data rather than aggregate IT investment is important as IT is general purpose technology that may serve different, even contradictory objectives. Finally, we utilize an empirical strategy that addresses the interdependence of hospitals organizational and technology adoption decisions. For example, hospitals may have integrated with physicians in response to financial pressure from insurers or their local competitors. This same pressure may reduce hospitals' ability to invest in monitoring IT. This type of interdependence has largely been ignored in the IT and organization literature and has never been addressed in the physician-hospital integration literature. Failure to address this interdependence would result in an underestimate of the affect of organization on monitoring IT adoption. We employ a statistical strategy, instrumental variables, that IT uses physician labor market variation to purge this bias from our estimates. FindingsWe find that, ceteris paribus, vertical integration increases monitoring technology demand by 27 percent. Our results suggest that monitoring IT provides hospitals with valuable information regarding physicians' clinical behavior. This monitoring information is more valuable for vertically integrated health systems. One possible interpretation is that the complexity of clinical practice makes it difficult to write detailed contracts over physicians' clinical decisions; thus, a health system that already enjoys relatively strong managerial authority could make subjective use of this monitoring while a non-integrated health system could not write a contract based on objective monitoring results. From a policy perspective, these results suggest organizational change is likely to play an important role in realizing the potential of health care IT. In particular, physician monitoring applications may have little value without complementary organizational investments that can take advantage of the new information. |